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Abstract 
 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have become ubiquitous in the current debate and have emerged 
as the key issue of global innovation policy. The ‘Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights’ (TRIPS), signed on 1994 as a founding element of the World Trade Organization, represent 
the most important attempt to establish a global harmonization of Intellectual Property protection. 
The aim of this paper is to critically re-examine what has become the common wisdom around 
IPRs, TRIPS and their effects. We argue that supporters of IPRs in the Western corporations and 
governments as well as detractors in global movements and developing countries have both over-
estimated their importance in the process of generation and diffusion of knowledge and innovation. 
On the basis of some key learnt lessons on the nature of innovation and technological change, we 
assess four theses about TRIPS and their impact on the global generation and distribution of 
knowledge. The policy implications concerning international organizations and technological 
transfer are finally discussed. 
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THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
FOUR LEARNT LESSONS AND FOUR THESES 
 
 
 
BULLETPOINTS For Summary 
 
• Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have emerged as the key issue of global innovation policy: 
through the ‘Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement’ (TRIPS), there is 
an attempt to impose worldwide a Western system of IPRs. 
• Western governments and large corporations claim that strong IPRs are needed to maintain 
investment in innovation. This position is contrasted by new political and social movements, 
which assert that muscular IPRs enforcement hampers economic growth and welfare in 
developing countries. The article argues that both positions overemphasise what IPRs can 
actually do to promote or obstruct innovation.  
• IPRs per se do not allow companies to appropriate the returns from their innovations unless they 
are matched to a wide ranging strategy which includes continuous learning and dynamic 
innovation. 
• There are substantial cross-industry differences in the role played by IPRs: while patents are 
rather significant in pharmaceuticals and copyright is important in the audiovisual industry, the 
majority of sectors are not seriously affected by neither strong nor weak IPR regimes. 
• In order to catch up, developing countries should put specific policies in place to nurture their 
absorptive capacity through the creation of appropriate infrastructure and human resources. 
Competence building is not hampered by IPRs. Developing countries should concentrate in 
active learning policies to acquire the knowledge of the most industrialized nations. 
• Western nations would better protect their wellbeing by focusing on promoting new knowledge 
and creativity rather than by impeding to new entrants to access the know-how they have 
already generated. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have become ubiquitous in the economic debate: the front pages 
of newspapers continuously report of major controversies among corporations, governments and 
advocacy groups. News such as the copyright issue of the Google Books project and the power of 
the Big Pharma’s patents over key drugs and vaccines have generated growing alarms and heated 
disputes. Some books, including Naomi Klein’s No Logo and Vandana Shiva’s Patents: Myth and 
Reality have become best-sellers. Science fiction has been quick to report these concerns, as shown 
by Michael Crichton’s Next. National Parliaments, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic 
Free Trade Association (NAFTA) are repeatedly addressing the issue. A brand new Pirate Party, 
whose main political goal is to get free access to software and copyrighted products, has even 
managed to elect its own deputies at the European Parliament. Above all, IPRs have become one of 
the core businesses of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In a word, IPRs have emerged as the 
key issue of global innovation policy. 
 
The ‘Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (TRIPS), signed on 1994, are a 
founding element of the WTO. TRIPS are the most important attempt to establish a global 
harmonization of Intellectual Property (IP) protection and enforcement putting international 
standards for the protection of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and design. They also provide a 
dispute settlement schema and establish enforcement procedures at the intergovernmental level. Not 
surprisingly, TRIPS have been highly debated by political scientists (May, 2002a; Ryan, 1998; Sell, 
2003) and economists (Maskus, 2000; Maskus and Reichman, 2005 among the others). But TRIPS 
have been debated also outside academe and have been vigorously opposed by non-governmental 
organizations and global movements (Drahos and Mayne, 2002). 
 
The aim of this paper is to critically re-examine what has become the common wisdom around 
IPRs, TRIPS and their effects. We argue that there has been an overestimation of the importance of 
IPRs in the process of generation and diffusion of knowledge and innovation. For both developed 
and developing countries, the key issue should be an active innovation and learning policy rather 
than the protection through IPRs of the already available knowledge. The debate has instead been 
twisted on IPRs as such rather than on knowledge generation and diffusion also because some key 
learnt lessons on the nature of innovation and technological change have not been duly taken into 
account. On the basis of these learnt lessons, we will assert four theses about TRIPS.  
 
This article will mainly focus on patents, while it will deal less with copyright and other IPRs (for a 
comprehensive collection of essays on this issue see Hess and Ostrom, 2006; see also Macmillan, 
2006 for a focus on copyrights). In the next section we provide the rationale behind the 
establishment of the IPRs systems across modern societies. Section three presents four learnt 
lessons which emerge from the literature of the economics of innovation and technological change. 
In section four we present four main theses on the globalization of the IPRs and their effects on the 
global generation and distribution of knowledge. The last section discusses the policy implications. 
 
2. THE FAUSTIAN BARGAIN AND THE RATIONALE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
The modern patent system, based on the objective assessment of the inventions, was introduced by 
the Venetian Republic in 1474 (May, 2002b). The two requirements indicated by the Venetian 
Republic - the usefulness and the novelty of the invention - are still in vigour today in all states. As 
in a Faustian bargain, the inventor and the government undertake a long term pact: the inventor 
commits herself to disclose all information of her invention, while the government guarantees that it 
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will provide legal protection to give exclusive rights on the economic returns of the invention (for a 
history of IPRs, see May and Sell, 2006).1 
 
IPRs have substantially evolved over the centuries but the Faustian bargain has remained 
unchanged. By providing intellectual property rights, the government assures the inventor the right 
to exclude others from using the outcome of her creative activities without her authorization. Thus 
the government gives the inventor a legal monopoly to exploit her invention and capture the 
economic benefits for a limited period of time. Legislation is far from uniform: for copyright the 
disclosure is complete by the moment you publish a book or a film, while inventions generally have 
to pass a merit exam before to be granted a patent. As it happens with many deals, also this one is 
hardly fully implemented and the inventor often tries to hide as much as possible about her 
invention, while the government is not in the position to assure full appropriation of the returns of 
the invention. 
 
Through this deal, the government manages to disclosing information on the already generated 
knowledge, and perhaps more importantly it provides an incentive to individuals to invest their time 
and resources in creative activities. Creative activities are in fact time-consuming and costly while it 
is always uncertain if they will produce something that generates economic returns. Once the 
inventor has discovered a new device or a musician written a new symphony, it becomes easy for 
others to exploit their outcomes at very low costs. Without legal protection, inventors and authors 
are not in the condition to fully exploit their works and appropriate the economic returns. As a 
results, in absence of public regulation, there would be an under investment in creative activities 
with respect to a social desirable level. 
 
An IPR regime can be defined as the written and costmary rules that apply within a specific 
political community. In some countries, the government enforces strong protection of IPRs and the 
holders are guaranteed that the infringements will be persecuted by the law and compensation will 
be obtained. These are the strong IPRs regimes. In other countries, the IPRs regime is much weaker 
and there is much less public interest to enforce IPRs. Policing violation is much more relaxed and 
courts are slow and/or permissive towards infringement. 
 
3. WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED ABOUT KNOWLEDGE AND INNOVATION: FOUR LEARNT 
LESSONS 
 
Scholars in the field of innovation have been largely exploring the mechanism which lies at the 
hearth of the creation and diffusion of knowledge and innovation, as well as the mechanism 
technological change. In this section we will briefly outline four learnt lessons derived from this 
body of literature which are relevant to assess the current IPRs controversy. 
 
Lesson 1: Knowledge is not information. Successful knowledge transfer is not only a matter of 
transferring information, but it requires learning trough acquiring a wide range of competences, 
skills and tacit knowledge. 
 
There is a basic distinction between information and knowledge. Information is a good which is 
costly to produce but by the moment it becomes public can be appropriated and transmitted at very 
low costs. Since all the costs are on the shoulders of the producers of information and there is no 
cost on the users, the lack of institutional protection would likely lead to an under-investment in 
these activities (Arrow, 1962). But can the outcomes of the creative and innovative activities for 
which intellectual property is requested be considered information? The Schumpeterian tradition 
argues that creative and innovative activities are the product of human knowledge, which cannot be 
transferred to potential users unless they are willing to invest efforts and time in learning. 
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Knowledge is therefore rather different from information since no user will be in the position to get 
economic advantages from it without an active learning effort and creative adaptive processes 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 60; Pavitt, 1987). 
 
But this is not the full part of the story. There is another important aspect that makes the transfer of 
knowledge difficult to achieve: not all knowledge can be properly codified. An important 
component of knowledge is tacit (Polanyi, 1966) and not even those who have generated it are able 
to properly articulate it in manuals, blue-prints, patents or other ‘codes’. A good cook is not 
necessarily able to transfer all his knowledge in a book of receipts. We are dealing with tacit 
knowledge when ‘we know more than what we can tell’ (Polanyi, 1967). In order to transfer tacit 
knowledge to an apprentice, the coded component should be complemented with experimentation 
and training. A key characteristic of IPRs is that they can protect the codified knowledge but not the 
tacit one. 
 
The picture is therefore more complex than it can appear in the first instance. On the one hand, the 
producers of knowledge have a wider battery of instruments to profit from it, ranging from selling 
the codified component through the IPRs system to transferring it thorough direct contact (for 
example through teaching programmes, technical cooperation, and so on). On the other hand, those 
willing to acquire knowledge should also invest their resources not just to buy IPRs, but also to get 
the infrastructures and the skills that make it possible to actually use knowledge for economic 
purposes. 
Lesson 2: Without imitating it is impossible to learn and innovate. The development of emerging 
economies is associated to creative imitation and absorption. 
Once Pablo Picasso stated that ‘good artists copy, great artists steal’. This also applies to knowledge 
generation: innovation cannot be created in a vacuum but rather is breed in an environment of 
creative imitation. In the XIX century, Germany and the United States benefited from the 
knowledge developed in the United Kingdom. In the second half of the XX century, all countries 
that successfully managed to catch up, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, 
undertook a process of continuous adoption and imitation of technologies developed abroad. Today, 
China, India and Brazil, among others, are acquiring the knowledge developed in the OECD 
countries. Every ‘emerging economy’ at some point of its history has relied on the adoption of 
foreign technologies.2 Technology transfer is a multidimensional phenomenon and to be effective it 
should pay attention to the features of the host countries, including its stage of development, the 
economic and industrial base, the characteristics of the institutions and last and least the IPRs 
regime. 
There is not a single channel that guarantees successful technology and knowledge transfer. On the 
contrary, each knowledge domain requires activating a variety of interconnected channels, 
including: i. Foreign direct investments, since the branches of multinational corporations in host 
countries often provide the most straightforward way to assimilate production methods of other 
countries; ii. Joint-ventures and strategic alliances, which allow companies of different countries to 
combine their skills, resources and expertise; iii. Technology licensing, which includes not just the 
acquisition of IPRs but also technical assistance and training; iv. Technology embodied in imports, 
especially in the case of capital goods and equipment. 
 
 Lesson 3: Knowledge is not about plug-and-play. To adopt foreign technology is a costly activity 
requiring a big deliberate domestic effort. 
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The availability of scientific knowledge and technology from abroad is only part of the story, but it 
is not as such sufficient to foster development driven by technological change. The other part of the 
story is the endogenous effort that catching up countries should be willing to undertake. In order to 
make sense and exploit the spectrum of knowledge, competences and technologies coming from 
abroad, each country needs to develop an ‘absorptive capacity’, i.e. the endogenous capacity to 
learn from these opportunities and to exploit them economically (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
1989). This recalls that learning is not a fully passive process. Countries need to monitor the 
advances occurring abroad, to create internal competences able to adopt foreign technologies and 
put in place specific measures to encourage their diffusion in the whole economy. 
 
Creating such an environment requires a comprehensive effort ranging from public policies, 
education and human resources, a reliable legislative system and institutions, incentives and trade 
policies, sometimes referred as developmental state.3 In the second half of the XX century, Western 
technology was equally available to Latin American and to East Asian countries, but the latter 
countries only have managed to acquire it up to the point to be able to compete on a par, mostly 
because of the active learning policies implemented (Wong, 2004; Woo-Cumings, 1999).  
 
National R&D investment to absorb foreign technology has been a crucial enabling factor for the 
US economic growth during the 1900-1946 period (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989) and for the 
Japanese reconstruction during the post war period (Morishima, 1982). This is often associated to 
the activities carried out by both the business and the public sectors. Firms in the catching up 
countries need to invest in R&D, capital goods, equipment and infrastructures to develop the 
appropriate knowledge and capabilities to adopt foreign knowledge (Freeman, 1987; Hou and San, 
1993; Mowery and Oxley, 1997; Westphal et al., 1985). In turn governments need to implement 
dedicated policies to foster public R&D and education as well as to support trade and foreign direct 
investment (Bell and Pavitt, 1997). Countries that succeeded in catching up relied on combination 
of devices to acquire foreign technology with policies aimed at building competences and skills 
internally. 
 
Lesson 4: The ways to profit from innovation are infinite. IPRs are only one of the several tools 
in firms’ competition and are effective in a few industries only. 
 
Innovation is one of the most heterogeneous economic activities. A hair pin and a song, a jet engine 
and a statistical method, a drug and a machine tool could all be innovations. The heterogeneous 
nature of the phenomenon is equally reflected in the sources and methods employed to appropriate 
the returns provided by innovation activities. The methods to guarantee the returns of innovations 
change considerably across industries, markets and countries, and also evolve over time. The most 
effective way to appropriate the returns of innovation is by combining a battery of different 
strategies (Teece, 1986). 
 
The methods used by firms to appropriate returns from their innovations can be broadly divided into 
two large categories. The first category comprises the legal methods associated to IPRs. The second 
category is represented by other economic methods, which include industrial secrecy, lead time, 
differentiation, and market distribution. The relative importance of the two categories considerably 
varies across technologies and industries. But a wealth of empirical studies has consistently shown 
that IPRs alone cannot guarantee alone the full appropriation of innovations.4 On the ground of in-
depth statistical surveys carried out at the firm level, it emerges that patents, the most important and 
controversial component in the IPRs family, are very important in one industry only, the 
pharmaceutical, and, to a lesser extent, the chemical. But patents are not a key competitive factor in 
other high tech industries such as electronics, telecommunication, motor vehicles and machinery. In 
some high tech industries such as aerospace and nuclear energy, patents are not important at all 
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since industrial secrecy is much more relevant. Profit seeking firms implement other strategies to 
exploit innovation including lead time, moving down the learning curve, sales and service efforts 
and secrecy. In the computer industry firms are increasingly relying on new forms of IPRs such as 
the GNU General Public License (GPL) for the development of the so-called open source software. 
Contrary to the traditional IPRs logic, the GPL allows anyone to use and modify the software. As a 
result, we have witness over the last decade the emerging of new business models in this industry 
which allow firms to profit relying on new strategies based on combinations of ‘traditional’ and 
new forms of IPRs (Chesbrough, 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Tapscott and Williams, 2006). 
Other significant differences emerge according to the individual characteristics of new technologies 
and, as expected, patents are better able to protect product rather than process innovations. 
 
This does not necessarily imply that firms consider patents useless: otherwise it would be difficult 
to explain why firms bother to file, apply and pay for several hundred thousands patents every year. 
But even when they have a substantial patent portfolio, firms declare that they are not able to profit 
from them unless they combine the legal protection with other economic instruments of 
appropriation. 
 
While there is abundant evidence on the manufacturing industry and on the patent system, there is 
less evidence on the appropriability system in the service industry and on the copyright (for a 
significant exception, see Blind et al., 2003). But the available evidence suggests that 
manufacturing and services on the one hand, and patents and copyrights on the other hand, have 
several similarities. A few industries strongly rely on copyright and are damaged by copyright 
infringement. The cartoon films, for example, appear to rely on strong copyright systems as much 
as the pharmaceutical industry relies on patents. But copyright enforcement alone cannot guarantee 
the full appropriation of the returns unless it is combined with other economic instruments. 
Similarly, in the industrial design sector, firms do not rely so much on the effectiveness of the 
design registration as a means to protect their new products (Filippetti, 2009). 
 
The innovator’s perspective is rather specular to the imitator’s. Strong regimes of IPRs make 
imitation slightly more costly and slower but not impossible since there is often the possibility to 
‘invent around’, namely a set of activities through which a competitor can produce an effective 
functional substitute for the product protected by IPRs without infringing its legal rights. On the 
contrary, weak regimes of IPRs make imitation cheaper and faster. But prospective imitators need 
to acquire a wide range of expertise that can be done through a substantial investment in building 
the knowledge base requested. 
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Box 1 – What has the economics of innovation to say about knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights? 
 
Lesson 1: To consider knowledge as information, as often done in the debate on IPRs, leads to wrong analyses and 
policies. The acquisition of knowledge requires that both the teacher and the learner are willing to devote time, 
resources and efforts to acquire it. This makes the mechanisms of knowledge transmission more complex than those 
related to information. 
 
Lesson 2: Any innovative process is based also on creative imitation and copying. There is no country that has managed 
to catch up without relying on the knowledge base of other and more developed countries. A conceptual separation 
between “innovators” and “imitators” is therefore wrong since good innovators builds up on the state of the art and 
good imitators need to improve to imitate and adopt others’ innovations 
 
Lesson 3: To take advantage from foreign technologies, developing countries should put in place explicit policies to 
create adequate absorptive capacity in terms of endogenous competences, skills, infrastructures and institutions. 
 
Lesson 4: IPRs are just one of the channels used by companies to appropriate the returns from their innovations. There 
are cross-industry differences in the effectiveness of IPRs and while Pharmaceuticals is heavy dependent on patents and 
Children’s films are heavily dependent on copyrights, in the majority of industries IPRs are of moderate importance. 
Moreover, IPRs are much more effective if combined with wider companies’ strategies which include continuous 
learning and innovation. 
 
4. FOUR THESES ON THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
On the ground of the learnt lessons summarized above, how can we interpret the current 
controversy on the global regime of IPRs and, in particular, TRIPS? We affirm in this section four 
thesis which somehow put in a different context several of what has become the traditional wisdom.  
 
First Thesis: TRIPS aim at imposing the Western and broken IP regime to the rest of the world 
 
A Silent Revolution in IPRs started in the United States. – Over the last few decades, the United 
States have introduced several institutional changes that strengthened the IPRs regime. These 
changes have generated greater penalties for IPRs infringement, have allowed intellectual property 
also for publicly funded R&D and have enlarged the scope of patents to unexpected areas: in a 
nutshell they have introduced a ‘silent revolution’ (Andersen, 2004; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). To 
detail: 
• The establishment of a centralized appellate court for patents, the so called ‘The Patent Court’, 
in 1992. This Court represents the change towards a pro-patent era after a long period of weak 
patents. Data on patent litigations show that the Patent Court has taken the direction of 
strengthening patent-holder’ rights (Gallini, 2002; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). 
• The Bayh-Dole Act approved in the United States in 1980 to facilitate the commercialization of 
inventions developed in the public sector, allowing universities and other publicly funded 
institutions to grant patents and exclusive license the results of research contracts funded by 
Federal agency. Through the Bayh-Dole Act, also the publicly funded R&D has become 
privately exploitable. Several other OECD countries have imitated the Bayh-Dole act and 
introduced similar legislation (for an assessment, see Mowery and Sampat, 2004) . 
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• The possibility to get the protection of patents has been broadened to activities that were not 
previously eligible. Often patents have been granted to inventions that do not seem to be 
particularly useful, such as devices to ‘measuring breasts with a tape to determine bra size’, or 
‘executing a tennis stroke while wearing a knee pad’ (Gleick, 2003). But the scope of the patent 
protection has also been allowed in key sectors such as software, business methods, statistical 
methods, genes, plant genetics, micro-organisms and so on. This is implementing what the US 
Supreme Court already advocated in 1980: ‘anything under the sun that is made by men’ should 
be worthy of patent protection (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). Further, patents are now granted also 
for discoveries that are very close to ‘life’: about forty thousand DNA-related patents have been 
granted (Heller, 2008, p. 50). 
 
Is the West IP system broken? - Although they have not been replicated to the same extent in 
Europe and Japan, the stronger regime of IPRs emerged in the USA has become a model for other 
continents. But this model is far from satisfactory. Three main kinds of criticisms have been made.  
• A growing attention has been provided towards the so-called ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’. 
Long ago, it was argued that a lack of property rights may destroy private incentives to 
maintain and upgrade public goods (Hardin, 1968). However, too much ownership may have 
the opposite effect and in the realm of knowledge may impede the circulation of information 
and impede innovation (Hardin, 1968; Heller, 2008; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). This is 
particularly manifest in those industries in which innovation rely on systemic technology and 
integrated knowledge (i.e. biotechnology, computer, and telecommunication). IPRs are 
increasingly moving deeper to cover data and facts which represent the basic ingredients of the 
scientific practise and research (Boyle, 2003; David, 2000). The proprietary structure of this 
kind of knowledge could seriously hamper the scientific advancement. 
• Because of the new legislation, firms have developed a propensity to patent more in order to 
take hostage as many technologies they can to hamper other firms technological advancement 
and to avoid being blocked themselves (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). Rather than 
promoting innovation, they are restricting innovative capacity to a few incumbent firms. 
• Eventually, the current rules fail to provide predictable property and produces costly disputes 
and excessive litigation that outweigh positive incentives and profits stemming from 
innovative activities (Bessen and Meurer, 2008; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). As John Barton 
argued ‘the number of intellectual property lawyers in the US is growing faster than the 
amount of researchers’ (Barton, 2000). Instead of promoting innovation, IPRs are diverting 
resources from innovation. 
 
Are TRIPS the imposition of a rotten IP regime to the developing world?  - TRIPS have become one 
of the most controversial issues not only in academe, but also in the political arena. Civil activists, 
NGOs and the public opinion in general have fiercely denounced TRIPS as a colonialist act 
imposing the Western standard of the IPRs system to the rest of the world (Shiva, 2001). In fact, 
TRIPS are the key instrument to enlarge outside the West the ‘silent revolution’ in IPRs. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement strengthened previous standards by mandating enforcement in all member 
countries and by reforming the Dispute Settlement procedures within the WTO. Art. 4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement applies a cornerstone of the global trade policy, the so-called Most Favoured Nation 
clause, to the IPRs (World Trade Organization, 2009b).5 Article 10 allows the copyright protection 
of software and datasets, and fixes the term of protection to no less than 50 years. Article 33 
establishes that the protection of patents shall not end before 20 years. Article 35 requires Member 
countries to protect the layout-designs of integrated circuits in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, negotiated under the auspices of 
World International Property Organization (WIPO) in 1989. Part three of the TRIPS Agreement is 
dedicated to the enforcements of IPRs, and art. 61 requires that Members should provide civil as 
 10 
well as criminal remedies for the infringement of IPRs. This implies that all WTO members should 
develop or modernize their judicial systems and enforcement procedures to comply with TRIPS 
(World Trade Organization, 2009b). 
 
Through TRIPS, the IP systems of the most advanced countries is therefore exported from 
developed to developing countries, from countries that invest massively in R&D and innovation to 
countries with limited resources and infrastructures, from net high tech exporters to net importers. 
Before the TRIPS most of the developing countries did not extend protection to emerging 
technologies such as software, integrated circuits and electronic database, nor allowed IP to plant 
varieties. One of the most controversial issues has been the possibility to patent in pharmaceuticals, 
an industry to which TRIPS dedicate a special attention (Lanoszka, 2003). India, Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico and several other countries had a weak IP protection on drugs which allowed the 
development of a generic drug national industry that is now incompatible with TRIPS. 
 
Regarding the enforcement and dispute settlement provisions, TRIPS introduces a fundamental 
novelty with respect to the previous international setting. Both the Paris Convention for the 
protection of industrial property and the Berne Convention for the protection of artistic and literary 
property provided no effective procedures for settling IPRs disputes. TRIPS have dramatically 
changed this state of affairs by linking IPRs to international trade allowing advanced countries to 
further increase their bargaining power in the WTO. This assures a more effective enforcement and 
the possibility to using trade provisions, such as tariffs and quotas, to punish the rule-breaking 
countries. Table 1 shows the disputes within the WTO concerning TRIPS. This ‘who is suing 
whom’ table shows that the US have the lion’s share of the disputes. 
 
Table 1 Who is suing whom? Disputes cases related to TRIPS and TRIPS enforcement 
 
USA EC Argentina Brazil Canada Denmark Greece India Ireland Pakistan Portugal Sweden Japan Total
USA n.a. 5 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 20
EC 3 n.a. 1 1 1 6
Australia 1 1
Brazil 1 n.a. 1
Canada 1 n.a. 1
Total 4 7 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 29
C
o
m
pl
a
in
a
n
t
Sued country
 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on WTO data (World Trade Organization, 2009a). 
 
The harmonisation of IPRs introduced by the TRIPS Agreement has led to a race to the top which is 
certainly not advantageous to countries willing to catch up also by acquiring the expertise, 
knowledge and innovations of the leaders (Chang, 2003). Moreover, for most of the WTO 
Members, TRIPS are an exogenous introduction of rules and standards. It is somehow surprising 
that this expansion of Western standards occurred in a moment in which the usefulness of IPRs as a 
method to foster innovation and knowledge development is seriously challenged also in the West. 
Why has this happened? In the next section we will show how a few corporations succeeded to 
persuade more than 100 countries, most of them being net importers of technology, to ‘approve’ the 
most important revolution in the global IPRs. 
 
Second Thesis: TRIPS are the outcome of a non democratic process driven by a club of US 
corporations 
 
A club of US multinational corporations played a major role in getting TRIPS Agreement providing 
one of the most important lessons on how business power shapes international politics (Ryan, 1998; 
Sell, 2003). However, this should not be necessarily seen as a sign of strength of the American 
economy, but rather as the consequence of the progressive erosion of the US technological 
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hegemony. Already at the beginning of the 1980s the US supremacy in high tech trade came to a 
showdown because of the impressive growth of Japan and, to a lesser extent, of Europe (Nelson and 
Wright, 1992; Pianta, 1988; Rosenberg and Steinmueller, 1988). 
 
The US trade policy underwent by the mid-1980s to a major shift in response to their threatened 
technological world hegemony. Beginning in the early 1980s, annual trade deficit reached 
unprecedented levels. The US trade deficit topped 100 billion dollars in 1984 and peaked the record 
of 153 billions dollars in 1987 (US Department of Commerce, 2009). Linking the loss of market 
shares to IP infringement by other countries could provide an explanation for the former and a 
policy action for the latter. The US corporations hoped to find a remedy to their lack of 
competitiveness by making IPRs stronger in their abroad markets. By mid 1980s the US 
administration began to encompass its pro-IPRs silent revolution also in international affairs. This 
was justified by the feeling that free trade was not any more fair trade, since a substantial part of the 
R&D and innovative investments financed by American corporations were appropriated without 
payment by competing firms in other countries. As the former assistant general counsel of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) said ‘Our companies find that they must compete with 
the unauthorized copies not only in the source country but in third countries as well’ (cited in Sell, 
2003, p. 81).  
 
In a more integrated global trade regime, in which high tech industries were becoming the crucial 
factor of competitiveness, the fact that other countries had a more permissive regime of IP was 
perceived as one of the causes of the US trade deficit. As the assistant secretary of commerce 
argued, ‘there is a widespread bipartisan agreement that the protection of intellectual property 
worldwide is a critically important factor in expanding trade in high technology products’ (cited in 
Sell, 2003 p. 83). The link between trade and IPRs was formally established in 1984 in the Trade 
and Tariff Act in which, under Section 301, IP protection became a motive to assessing other 
countries eligibility for non-reciprocal trade concession.6 
 
From 1984 until the signing of the TRIPS Agreement of 1994 the USTR played a major role in 
bringing the interests of the US corporations in the global arena. During the Uruguay Round the 
USTR was in close connection with the major corporations through the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPA) and the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC). IIPA was created to 
promote the copyright industry interest, while the IPC consisted of twelve chief executive officers 
representing the IPRs-intensive industries. These influential business associations (Ryan, 1998) 
provided to the USTR several reports where they pointed out the damages caused to the US 
business by the IP piracy country-by-country. IPC major achievement was involving European and 
Japanese industry in their policy so that the US, Europe and Japan were united about the inclusion 
of an IP code in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. When eventually WTO replaced 
GATT in 1994, it included the TRIPS Agreement as one of the core pillars. As Susan Sell explicitly 
claims, ‘twelve corporations made public law for the world’ (Sell, 2003, p. 96). In return, 
developing countries obtained the liberalization of international trade in textile and apparel through 
the Multifiber Agreement (see also Maskus, 2000).  
 
 Third Thesis: TRIPS may serve the interests of Western corporations but not necessarily of the 
Western economies 
 
The fact that TRIPS have been a Western imposition does not necessarily imply that they will 
manage to serve Western interests. Since the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement the trend of 
trade performance of the USA and other advanced countries has not changed remarkably. Emerging 
countries, those which TRIPS aimed to discipline for their alleged unfair IP infringement, have 
continued to erode the trade balance of the US, Europe and Japan. TRIPS have so far certainly 
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served the interests of some specific corporations, but it does not seem to be able alone to solve the 
problems for which it has been imposed, namely the challenge to the Western primacy in 
knowledge-intensive industries. 
 
In Figure 1 we report the Average Annual Growth of exports relative to the hi tech products for 
some selected countries, over the period 1999-2005. The two emerging giants, China and India, 
continue to improve their performance in the international trade of hi tech industries against the 
Triad, i.e. US, Europe and Japan.  
 
Figure 1 Average Annual Growth of exports relative to the hi-tech products for selected countries, 1999-2005 
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Source: authors’ elaboration on data from the European Commission report ‘Europe in the global research landscape’ 
(European Commission, 2007) 
 
This trend is confirmed also in terms of world share of hi tech exports reported in Table 2. In 2005 
China has become the larger exporter of Computers and Office Machinery reaching a world share 
equal to 28.3 per cent followed by US (14.6) and EU-25 (8.3), and the second world exporter in 
electronics and telecoms. The supremacy of the Triad is still evident in an IPR sensitive industry as 
the pharmaceutical, where Western countries still accounts for over the 70 percent of world exports. 
 
Table 2 Hi tech exports: world market shares 1999-2005 (%) 
 
1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005
United States 26.4 19.3 18.9 14.6 23.4 14.7 20.2 22.8
EU-25 17.1 17.2 8.2 8.3 11.5 12.1 38.6 45.6
Japan 12 8.7 11.9 6.0 13.3 9.6 4.0 2.3
China 3.4 15.0 4.9 28.3 2.9 12.9 3.1 3.6
South Korea 4.7 5.8 4.3 4.7 7.0 7.7 0.8 0.5
Brazil 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2
India 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.5 1.9
Russian Federation 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Total hi-tech products Computer and Office Machinery
Electronics and 
Telecoms Pharmaceutical
 
 
Source: as for Figure 1 
 
Not surprisingly, the political concern about the declining US competitiveness has shifted from 
infringement of IPRs towards offshore outsourcing and offshoring.7 The White Paper ‘Offshore 
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Outsourcing and the America’s Competitive Edge: Losing Out in the High Technology R&D and 
Services Sectors’ released by Senator Joe Lieberman in May 2004 illustrates a rather different 
concern. The White Paper focuses on the ‘challenge, which potentially could affect high and R&D 
research jobs, not just manufacturing and call center jobs’ (Lieberman, 2004, our emphasis). The 
main point raised is that US corporations are moving abroad key components of their innovative 
activities, such as engineering, design, R&D and high-tech services. According to a survey carried 
out by UNCTAD (2005), Transnational Corporations (TNCs) perceive China and India as the most 
attractive locations, first and third respectively, where to invest in R&D activities. The Toyota 
Technical Center in Thailand, Motorola’s R&D centres in China and Microsoft’s sixth global 
research centre in Bangalore are just a few examples witnessing the fact that TNCs are investing at 
the cutting edge of the technology in the emerging countries (UNCTAD, 2005) (on the 
globalization of technology see also Archibugi and Iammarino, 2002; Archibugi and Pietrobelli, 
2003). 
 
The TRIPS Agreement has therefore not reversed countries’ relative performance since 1994. The 
real winners from TRIPS are not the advanced countries, but rather the large corporations who 
pressed for their adoption. Empirical research has shown that multinational corporations are more 
likely to establish advanced and knowledge-based activities abroad if there is a strong and effective 
IPRs regime.8 Multinational corporations willing to expand geographically their scope therefore 
need stronger IPRs regimes in the host countries (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 29).  
 
The TRIPS Agreement, by strengthening the IP regime over the world has basically contributed to 
enlarge the playing field for large corporations. The latter have seen the opportunity to move their 
knowledge-based activities abroad by exploiting human resources, technological capabilities and a 
more reliable IPRs system. In the words of the Senator Lieberman ‘while the American companies 
may be improving their individual competitiveness in the short term, they may be collectively 
undermining America’s and their own competitiveness for the long haul’ (Lieberman, 2004). It is 
somehow surprising and worth reflecting upon the fact that Western governments, first and 
foremost the US one, have insisted so much in introducing a new global regime of IPRs that might 
jeopardize the interests of their own citizens. 
 
Fourth Thesis: TRIPS alone will not lead to an increase of the technology gap between Western 
countries and emerging countries 
 
While many commentators argue that TRIPS alone may lead to an increase in the gap between the 
most technologically advanced and the least technologically advanced nations (see, for example, 
Chang, 2003; May, 2002a), we believe that the importance of IPRs should not be overestimated. 
IPRs clearly favour the generators of innovations and deter the imitators. But the lack of a clear-cut 
division between innovators and imitators, which stems from the complexity of the mechanisms of 
generation and diffusion of knowledge and innovation, will not allow IPRs and arrangements such 
as TRIPS to play a decisive role.  
 
National IP systems are often the consequence of production needs (Moser, 2005). Developed 
countries have exempted particular industries from IP protection in accordance with their needs at a 
particular time. Since the Eighteenth century, IP policy was conducted as an important part of trade 
and industrial policy (Khan, 2002). For example, Germany did not provide patent protection to food 
products, pharmaceutical or chemical products, but only to their production processes. The 
American law at the beginning provided strong protection for their citizens but weak protection for 
foreign inventors. The Japanese system was deliberately designed to favour adoption and diffusion 
of technology (Ordover, 1991). In a similar vein, India did not allow patent protection for drugs, 
chemical, optical glass and semiconductors, Thailand excluded chemical, drugs, food and 
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agricultural machinery, and Brazil did not offer protection for foodstuffs, chemicals and drugs 
(Chang, 2003; Khan, 2002). 
 
If we look at how the IPRs systems have evolved within nations, there is the well founded suspicion 
that strong IPRs seem to be the consequence rather then the cause of development (Maskus, 2000; 
Mokyr, 2002). As the countries climb the development ladder and they become producers of 
innovations and technologies, the strengthening of IPRs is likely to come as a result of both 
industrial policy and pressure from the business. However, we contend that, while recognizing that 
IP have played an important role in sustaining industrial policies and development, today there are 
several factors at work which can impede to TRIPS to wide the technological gap between Western 
and emerging economies. 
 
A great deal of empirical work has been carried out to address a simple question: do stronger IPRs 
encourage transfer of technology?9 The main findings of this body of literature can be synthesized 
as follows: IPRs can be advantageous for countries with a certain degree of absorptive capacity and 
strong technological infrastructures, while they tend to increase the costs and reduce technology 
transfer for poorer countries. This evidence reinforces our assumption that the impact of IPRs on 
technology transfer has been overestimated since the magnitude of technology flows are affected by 
a variety of other factors including: the size of the market, the development of appropriate 
capabilities, the endowment of cheap and/or skilled human resources, and the presence of a reliable 
institutional environment. In a nutshell, a strong IPR regime is not in itself a sufficient condition for 
the transfer of technology to occur. 
 
The IPRs do not have either a direct role in explaining different rates of growth across countries 
(Park and Ginarte, 1997), and as the Word Bank recognizes ‘at different times and in different 
regions of the world, countries have realised high rates of growth under varying degrees of IPR 
protection’ (World Bank, 2001). Within the manufacturing sector, the only industry in which IPRs 
seem to have a good efficacy in avoiding copying is pharmaceuticals. In most manufacturing 
industries, thus, the processes at the base of the adoption, adaptation and creative imitation of 
foreign technologies have large room for inventing around avoiding IP infringements even in a 
stronger IPRs regime.  
 
In several occasions IPRs can also make it easier to invent around protected technologies inasmuch 
patents and copyright force the inventors to articulate and provide the disclosure of the 
information.10 The institution of IPRs provides a legal framework for contractual agreements 
concerning technologies, which encourage the institution of ‘markets for technology’, making it 
easier the international transfer of technology and its diffusion at the local level (Arora et al., 2001; 
Lall, 2003). New emerging phenomena, such as the open source software, which offer innovative 
applications on non-proprietary IPRs base and that cannot be made legally excludable, offer a great 
deal of opportunity to emerging and developing countries to access crucial know how at very low 
costs and avoiding IP infringements. Thus, it is the nature itself of knowledge generation and 
diffusion mechanisms that make the real world very different from a hypothetical one where IPRs 
are able to block the use of specific know how. To conclude, we challenge the idea that TRIPS can 
be held responsible for the lack of catching up of developing countries since technology flows 
across countries are not driven by IPRs regimes alone. 
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Box 2 – Four Theses to Assess TRIPS 
 
First Thesis: TRIPS aim at imposing the Western and broken IP regime to the rest of the world 
The IPRs regime has become stronger in the Western world. This trend has started in the United States, where the scope 
of IPRs have been extended to additional areas (e.g. software) and to additional subjects (e.g. public research centres 
and universities). But other Western countries have imitated the same trend. Through TRIPS, the US and other Western 
governments are trying to expand the Western logic to all countries. This has happened in a moment in which the ability 
of IPRs to provide incentives to the innovators and to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge has been increasingly 
questioned in the West itself. 
 
Second Thesis: TRIPS are the outcome of a non democratic process driven by a club of US corporations 
TRIPS have not been debated and negotiated as a global public good. On the contrary, they have been strongly pushed 
by the United States. In particular, they are the outcome of the pressures made by a handful of US corporations that 
have asked to, and obtained from, their government to act in their behalf.  
 
Third Thesis: TRIPS may serve the interests of Western corporations but not necessarily of the Western economies 
There is no evidence that TRIPS have been advantageous for the American citizens at large. On the contrary, it seems 
that TRIPS have been important to allow TNCs to expand their innovative activities globally relying on stronger IP 
regimes abroad 
 
Fourth Thesis: TRIPS alone will not lead to an increase of the technology gap between Western countries and 
emerging countries 
Both supporters and detractors of TRIPS have put too much emphasis on the economic significance of legal devices 
regulating intellectual property. By themselves, legal devices can neither impede developing countries to catch up nor 
allow developed countries to preserve their dominion in technological innovation. It would be much more important to 
concentrate on the economic, rather than the legal conditions, that allow or impede countries to maintain or acquire their 
knowledge base. 
 
 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? 
 
Over the last thirty years, the United States has started a race to increase the proprietary nature of 
knowledge, and it has managed to get at various stages the support of other Western countries. This 
privatization of knowledge had also an international dimension with TRIPS, an agreement pushed 
by a small number of Western multinational corporations and aimed to impose to the entire world a 
regime of IPRs dominant in the West and with evident signs of crisis. The strengthening of IPRs 
and TRIPS, however, have not and could not change the nature of knowledge and the ways in 
which this can be transferred among economic agents. As we have reiterated in this article, to 
achieve a successful transfer of know how between economic agents, both of them should be 
willing to devote time, resources and efforts to teach and to learn. For these reasons, we have 
argued that the importance of IPRs has been grossly overestimated: per se they can neither allow 
knowledge transfer nor obstruct it. On the one hand, IPRs cannot impede prospective imitators to 
acquire knowledge but just making it a bit longer and a bit more costly. Firms, in fact, profit much 
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more from their economic monopoly position built around their innovation rather than from the 
legal monopoly associated to their IPRs. On the other hand, even in absence of IPRs potential 
imitators will not be able to master knowledge unless they invest their time and resources. In spite 
of the often heated tone of the debate, the IPRs controversy seems to be a ‘much ado about nothing’ 
controversy. 
 
True, some key industries rely strongly on IPRs both at home and internationally. It is well known 
that pharmaceutical products are effectively protected by patents. Developing countries that cannot 
pay the full price for these drugs will not find themselves in the position to offer to their citizens the 
deserved medications. The judicial case of a few US pharmaceutical companies (the so-called Big 
Pharma) against the South African government for the use of drugs to combat HIV infection has 
been the most spectacular case precisely because there were at stake concentrated economic 
interests on the one hand and a life-saving drug on the other hand. But can we generalize from this 
case? There are not many life-saving drugs around (unfortunately!) and several of them are not any 
more protected by IPRs. And we should not forget Pharmaceuticals is just one of the several 
industries in the economy. 
 
It is also true that other key sectors of the information society are strongly dependent on other IPRs 
(Guy, 2007). In spite of the massive investment afforded by companies in the industry to make it 
difficult to copy software, software revenues strongly benefit from the legal protection guaranteed 
by copyright. It is also true that audiovisual products strongly rely on IPRs. These are the typical 
products which are costly to produce but that can be copied at virtually zero costs. Software and 
audiovisual entertainments are increasing important industries but, again, they do not represent the 
total economy. It is difficult to justify that the economic development of emerging countries is 
hampered by the copyright on CDs and DVDs. And it is even more difficult to argue that pop 
singers, film stars and software companies are ruined by IP infringements. Moreover, stronger 
protection of IPRs may generate unexpected new entrants, as it happened with Linux in the case of 
software and Bollywood in the case of audiovisuals. There is the tendency to attribute to IPRs the 
existence of barriers to entry, and this is in principle true since IPRs generate a legal monopoly. But 
economic reality shows that barriers to entry are more often associated to anti-competition practices 
than at IPRs alone. Weakening IPRs may help to generate a more competitive market, but this 
should also be combined to more active anti-trust policies. 
 
Those Western-based Corporations that have so much pressed for stronger IPRs have not realized 
that IPRs codify the positions of the past, not those of the future. To stick to the defence of IPRs is 
the typical position of losers, i.e. those which could maintain their market share only by relying on 
monopoly positions achieved through the innovations of the past. Winners, on the contrary, would 
be much less worried about defending the innovations of the past through IPRs since they are 
confident that they can maintain and enlarge their market positions through continuous innovation. 
The literature on appropriability has clearly shown that IPRs are just one, and not even the most 
effective, method to secure returns to companies’ innovations. 
 
But our analysis has also some important implications for public policies. We have argued that 
governments that have made IPRs stronger at home and in the world have not made a good service 
to their citizens. In fact, they have somehow diverted attention from the problem of offshoring of 
knowledge intensive jobs providing an advantage to their major corporations without realizing that 
also their workers may pay a price for it. A better service to citizens would have been provided by 
greater international cooperation in science and technology, involving both public and business 
players in large-scale research projects. These projects could provide new technological 
opportunities that companies could then exploit competitively. 
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We have already made it clear that developing countries should not have accepted TRIPS. 
Somehow these countries were confident that it would have been too difficult to enforce TRIPS and 
that, after all, the WTO devices were too slow and too complex to lead to sanctions of last resort. 
This is somehow what has happened: the number of controversies continues to be rather small. But 
opposing to TRIPS will certainly not by itself allow developing countries to fill their technology 
gap. Developing countries need much more demanding active policies to acquire knowledge. Some 
of them have managed to move from “developing” to “emerging” and even “developed” countries. 
The active learning policies of these countries, such as the East Asian tigers, realized that there are 
strong complementarities between domestic education, acquisition of knowledge from abroad, 
hosting foreign investment, and endogenous innovation. The policies of these countries should be a 
source of inspiration for those countries that are still lagging behind. 
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